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--IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JERRY R.

PROBST I
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, J. BRENT WOOD
d/b/a KITCO, INC. AND STATE
FARM FIRE & CASUALTY,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for review of a decision of the
Industrial Commission of Utah, and is brought pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-83 (1953, as amended).
The appellant claims that the Industrial Commission erred
in reducing the award previously entered by the Administrative
Law Judge.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On April 5, 1977, the Industrial Commission of Utah
acting through its Administrative Law Judge, Keith E. Sohm,
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Award in
this matter, which awarded the plaintiff a sum total of
$17,708.00 plus medical expenses as compensation for the

loss of his left hand, which was crushed and subsequently
amputated.

These injuries were found to have occurred in

the course of his employment by the defendants.

On June 24,

1977, the Commission, pursuant to a Motion to Review filed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the defendants, entered a Modification of A
.
ward' reduc.

-

the award to $11,198.58, plus medical expenses.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have the decisi'on Of the
Industrial Commission reversed and to have the original

2.

reinstated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 24, 19 76, the plaintiff-appellant,
Jerry Probst, was severely injured when his left hand was
crushed in a hydraulic press while working for the defend;·
As a result of the accident, the appellant's hand had to
be amputated _and he is now required to wear a prosthetic
device.

At the time of the injury, the appellant

~sa

full-time student at Brigham Young University and was
twenty-one years old.

He worked for the defendants on a

part-time basis at night and on the weekends and was bein:
paid $2. 50 per hour, which amount would have been increase.
to $3.00 or $3.25 per hour after the initial trainingper:
probably thirty days.

The injury occurred after the appel:.

had worked for the defendants for only four days. (R.14h
Following the injury, the appellant has worked a'.
other unskilled occupations which have paid him $500.00 p:
month and $6. 00 per hour as compensation and has continue:
his cbllege education.

(R.53, 68-69)

The Administrative Law Judge found that the facts
.

as proven constitute "a classic case

" d.

irec

tly in point

with the intent of Sections 35-1-76 and 35-1-75
Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

and, pursuant
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'

Utah

to those

statutes, specifically found that the appellant:
was of such age and experience when injured that
under natural conditions his wages would be increased
to the extent that he is entitled to the maximum
allowable weekly wage in effect at the time of his
injury.
The severity of the injury both as to
appearance and to inconvenience for life and
further considering the cost of replacing and
maintaining the artificial arm appliance further
convinces the Law Judge that the claimant is entitled
to the maximum average weekly wage for computation of
permanent partial disability which means he is
entitled tocompensationat the wage of $103.33 per
week for 168 weeks for a total of $17,359.44.
(R.144)
The Administrative Law Judge denied the appellant's
claim for a 15% increase based on the defendant's negligence
in maintaining on unsafe working place.
On the 24th of June, 1977 the Industrial Commission
modified the appellant's award and reduced the amounts
previously decreed.

This modification was based on the

conclusions that the legislature has intended a narrow
application of Section 35-1-76, Utah Code Annotated, and
that "the wage of the claimant should be determined on the
wage within the same employment."

(R.176-180)

ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
The appellant's contention is that the Industrial
Commission acted arbitrarily and contrary to well-established
Utah law when it modified the appellant's award and gave
a narrow construction to the interpretation of Utah Code
Annotated, § 35-1-76 (1933, as amended).

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED IN AN ARBITn'

'"'RY A::

CAPRICIOUS MANNER AND MISAPPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, § 35-1-76

(1953, AS AMENDED) WHEN IT

REDUCED THE APPELL.l'.\.NT' S AWARD FOR THE LOSS OF

HI~ HAND.

The appellant's main contention on appea 1 concerns
Section 35-1-76 of the Utah Code, which reads as follows:
If i t is established that the injured employee was 0f
such age and experience when injured that under
natural conditions his wages would be expected to
increase, that fact may be considered in arriving
at his average weekly wage.
This humanitarian statute was found to be applicable to
this case by each of the preceding tribunals, and this
Court is asked to interpret the statute for the first tim2
in more than forty years.

It is the appellant's belief tho

the humanistic intentions of this law have been violated
by the "narrow" construction given by the Industrial Cammi;,
By its very language, it is clear that this statute
was intended to provide relief under certain circumstances
to those who are injured at an immature age and who have
not had adequate training.

The appellant respectfully

asserts that the Administrative Law Judge properly set
the average weekly wage at $103.33 per week.

This conclus:

gave proper consideration to the facts that the plaintiff
aining or skills,
was a person of immature years, h a d no tr
.
d . tended to
was employed on a temporary basis only, an in
·
capacity.
graduate from college and increase his earning
ellant had earr.,
Judge Sohm also properly found that t h e app
auent to

far in excess of the maximum amount allowed (subse.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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_......,,,

the injury) without any additional training or experience.
All of these factors were considered {and properly so)
in setting the rate of compensation.

The Judge heard all

of the evidence first-hand and was able to consider all
of the factors.
In reversing the Administrative Law Judge's decision,
the Industrial Commission gave the following as its basis
for modification:
The applicant was working part-time at the time
of the mishap.
Prior to 1971, Section 35-1-75 {f),
U.C.A. contained the following provision:
If the wage is on a part-time basis, and the
employment is regular, extend the wage to full-time
basis, or use the wage the injured would earn if
working full-time in such employment and determine
as above in {a) .
The above provision extended part-time employment
to full-time for calculation purposes. The extension
of full-time employment is what the applicant now
urges we should do.
Prior to 1971, any part-time
employment, as long as the employee was regular and
regardless of age and experience, the wage would
be extended to full-time. The elimination by the
legislature of sub-section {f) would indicate an
intent to prohibit the extension of all part-time
employees to full-time basis.
If this was the
intent, then the application of Section 35-1-76 would
be narrowed if not eliminated. The legislature did
not eliminate Section 35-1-76; therefore, we must
assume the intent was to narrow its application.
Even prior to 1971, the Supreme Court in our
opinion cited the narrower application of Section
35-1-76 in the case of Brewer v. Industrial Commission,
89 Utah 596 58 P.2d 33 when they stated:
The provision is peculiarly adapted to
apply in case of minors or persons of immature
years whose wages are usually less than that of
adults in like employment, but who could be
expected naturally and normally to reach the
wage scale of adults with increasing years and
experience. Where such persons are killed or
injured, they would be placed on a compara~l~
basis with adults, particularly where the inJ~ry.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitization
the Institute of Museum
and Library
Services
is such
as Law
will
reach
intoprovided
a by
period
beyond
maJority.
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I

I

I

We conclude the applicant in this case
was one
of immature years who could be expected to
reach a
higher wage scale and that his injury will reach
into a period long beyond his current age.
Having so concluded what consideration should
be used in extending his current wage of $2.SO
hour.
We believe the Court in the Brewer case ~er
also set the bounds for consideration. The Utah as
Court cited with approval the case of Industrial
Corrunission v. Olive V. Royer 122 Ohio St 271, 17l
N. E. 337 quoting the following language:
Those terms (age and experience) should not
be held to apply to all ambitious persons on the
sole ground they aspire to promotion in more
important, more skillful and more remunerative
employment.
We conclude that the wage of claimant should be
determined on the wage within the same employment.
Otherwise, in nearly all cases, i t could be shown the
injured employee had hopes of future changes in emplo1·
ment leading to conclusions based on speculation.
Claimant in this case has shown his ability to earn
a higher wage, as he is currently earning $6.00 per
hour.
However, we do not believe this fact shoold~
considered in determining the permanent partial
disability.
In this regard, we believe the
Administrative Law Judge was in error.
(R.177-178)
These conclusions are in direct contradiction to
previous decisions of this Court and the law as establish'
in several other states.
The Corrunission' s ci ta ti on of the dictum from the
Brewer and Royer decisions

(supra)

is clearly inappropriat

because those were cases in which i t was found that the
statute in question did not apply.

It is most contradicto

because the Commission also specifically found that
Section 35-1-76 did apply to the facts of this case.
d in
Therefore, the rationale is clearly inconsistent an '
he comroissioc
fact, undermines the conclusions reac h e d by t

the repeal
The Commission's conclusions based On
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

of section 35-J-75 (f) of the Code are also clearly erroneous.
As late as last year, this Court has repeatedly stated
that all doubts respecting the right of compensation are
to be resolved in favor of the claimant.
commission, 567 P.2d 153 (1977).

McPhie v. Industrial

This confirms the holdings

of many previous cases that the Workmen's Compensation Act
is to be liberally construed in favor of recovery.
No state has been more humane or consistent in
its application of these principles than has the State of
Utah.

In Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission,

103 Utah 371, 13S P.2d 266

(1943), this Court stated:

workmen's compensation acts are intended:
"to substitute a more humanitarian and economical
system of compensation for injured workmen or their
dependents in case of death which the more humane
and moral conception of our time requires," and
that such acts are "intended to afford injured
industrial workmen or their dependents simple,
adequate, and speedy means of securing compensation, to the end that the 'cost of human wreckage
may be taxed against the industry which employs
it' and that society be relieved of the support
of unfortunate victims of industrial accidents."
It is further stated that "If there is any doubt
'respecting the right to compensation, such doubt
should be resolved in favor of the employee or of
his dependents as the case may be,'" citing
Chandler v. Industrial Comm., 55 Utah 213, 184
P.1020, 8 A.L.R. 930.
"The Industrial Act, including the proqedure
therein provided, must be liberally construed, and
with the purpose of effectuating its beneficent
and humane objects." North Beck Mining Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 58 Utah 486, 200 P.111, 112.
These precepts of humanitarianism and beneficence have been
strongly established in other cases.
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 U.2d 185,
290 P.2d 692 (1955)

the Court stated:
-7-
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•
The concept upon which the Industrial c
Act is based represents a departure from thompensatior
.
e rules
o f common law in regard to compensation for · · .
suffered in employment.
Underlying the Act 7nJunes
.d
h
·
·
lS the
1 ea t at industry should bear its fair share
f
burdens i t creates through injuries to those oh the
·
•
W 0 Se["
in it, regardless of who was at fault in causi
·'
them.
Its objective is to alleviate hardshipsng
.
upon
wor k ers and their dependents due to industrial
injuries, and it has been wisely observed that tl
Act should be liberally construed to accomplish i~s
purposes.
290 P.2d at 693-694.
In speaking of the Act, Chief Justice Larson gave
the following rationale in Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash
Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885

(1945):

It is a beneficent act, passed to protect emoloye'
and those dependent upon them, and to tax the costs
of human wreckage against the industry which employs
it, such burden being added to the price of the
produce and thereby spread over the general consuming
users of the product of the industry.
Park Utah
Mines v. Ind. Comm., supra.
The general rules of
liberal statutory construction govern the act, keepiEc
in mind the purpose of its adoption.
Industrial
Comm. v. Daly Min. Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P.301.
It is to be liberally construed in favor of the injuri.
workman.
Ogden City v. Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 221,
193 P. 857; Chandler v. Ind. Comm., 55 Utah 213,
184 P. 1020, 8 A.L.R. 930.
These are all different
ways of saying that the purpose of the act is to view
the workman as a part of the industrial setup and
impose upon the industry the costs and burdens of the
breakage, wreckage or destruction of the human p~rt ..
of the industrial machinery, the same as of the inan 1 'I
and mechanical parts thereof.
132 P.2d at 379.
e and dest'.. I
This case is a striking example of the breakag
of the human part of the machinery.
.
d.irect 1 y t o th e i· s sue of interpretatic
In speaking
of the Act, this Court stated in Ogden Iron Works.-".'_:.
19421
Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (
that:
.
d
. th a view to
Legislation such as this Act, ma e wi
d
further social interests, must be interprete
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not only from the juridical, but also the social
point of view, and so as to give material justice
its due, while formal jurisprudence has to stand
back.
There should be no anxious clinging to a
dead letter; the interpretation should be liberal
and in keeping with the spirit of the legislation.
This view has been repeated emphasized in other decisions
such as Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah
436, 140 P.2d 644

(1943); M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission,

112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948); Looser v. Industrial
commission, 9 U.2d 81, 337 P.2d 965 (1959); and Askren
v. Industrial Commission, 15 U.2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964).
In Jories v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244
P.2d 640 (1952), this ourt stated that if there is any
doubt, it should always be resolved in favor of the employee.
In light of these many holdings the decision of the
Industrial Commission is practically inexplicable.

To

specifically give a "narrow" application to the statute is
directly contrary to the decisions of this Court.

The

ruling of the Commission is even more difficult to understand
in light of the nature of Section 35-1-76.

This statute was

clearly intended to help young people, particularly those
who are as seriously injured as the appellant, and the action
of the Commission would serve to effectively destroy its
humanitarian intent.

Such an effect is clearly contrary to

legislative and judicial intent.
It would appear that the Commission gave some weight
to the experience factor but made no allowance whatsoever
for the age factor provision of Section 35-1-76.

Despite

the explicit finding that the claimant was a person of
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

immature years, the Commission reduced the award to the
hourly wage he would have received in less th an one month
on the same -job and in the same employment.

Th'is is clear

contrary to its own findings and good conscience, as well
as the laws of this State.
Al though there are no Utah cases which interpret
the statute in question under analogous circumstances, ths:
are two excellent Oklahoma cases which are almost identica:
and which reach what the claimant considers to be a just
result.

These cases are helpful because the fact situatio·

are very similar to this case and the Oklahoma statute is
almost identical to Section 35-1-76.
In Harmon's Texaco Service Station v. Kessinger,;:
P. 2d 131 (Okla 1961) , the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed
a decision to increase the benefits paid to a minor on the
grounds that his wages were likely to increase.
the Court stated that:

In so doi:

"Obviously, this provision was

for the benefit of a minor.

It should be liberally constr

in favor of the minor."
Subsequent to the Kessinger decision, the Oklahom;
Supreme Court has re-affirmed its position in
Grimm, 425 P.2d 992

(Okla. 1967).

~

In that case, as in

this one, the permanent partial disability benefits were
set at the maximum statutory amount.

This again was basd

on the statute and the rule o f 1 aw that

.
l

t should be liber,

construed in favor of the minor.
Several New York cases also support

the Administr::

Law Judge's award.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

In Donnelly v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 1974
N.Y.S.2d 361 (1958), the New York Supreme Court considered
the case of a minor newsboy who sustained a permanent, workrelated injury.

The New York law, which is similar to

§ 35-1-76, applies only to minors.
In the Donnelly case, the appellate court upheld
a decision which increased the claimant's award approximately
600%.

This case, which will be more completely analyzed

under Point II, set forth the rationale for increases of
wages in cases where the employee is immature and working
at a temporary, low-paying job.
The reasoning and holding of the Donnelly decision
was reaffirmed in the case of Haldane v. Buffalo Evening
News, 174 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1958), in which the average weekly
wage was increased by more than 900% by employing the
sta~utory equivalent to U.C.A.

§ 35-1-76.

These figures

compare to an increase of only 19% in the present case ($3.25
as opposed to $3.87, which is the base rate for the state
maximum figure of $103.33 per week).

If an increase of

600% to 900% can be justified by consideration of the age
and experience of an employee, it should not be offensive
to grant an increase of 19% in light of the facts in this
case.

As previously stated, if

~

35-1-76 does not apply

in this action, it is unlikely that it can be applied
under any circumstances.

The use of the section in this

case was clearly intended by the legislature and was not
an abuse of discretion.
These cases stand in direct opposition to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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holdings in the Brewer and Royer decisions cited
Industrial Commission.

It is curious that these

by the

cases

should be cited to discover the guidelines to implement a
decision that was directly contrary to findings.

It is

the appellant's contention that the rationale oft~ N~
York cases should have been applied to reach the

proper

conclusions.
In modifying the Law Judge's award, the Industria;
Commission clearly violated the spirit of Section 35-1-Jo
and many prior rulings of this Court.

Their decision

should be rescinded and the original award reinstated.
POINT I I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND
UNREASONABLY WHEN IT LIMITED APPELLANT'S COMPENSATIO':I TO
THE SAME EMPLOYMENT.
The appellant also contends that the Industrial
Commission erred when i t concluded that:
• . • the wage of claimant should be deter;nined .
on the wage within the same employment. Otherwise
in nearly all cases, it could be shown the
injured employee had hopes of future changes
in employment leading to conclusions based on
speculation.
(R.178)
Such a conclusion amounts to no more than an assertion by
the Commission that they will not abide by the spirit and
intent of Section 35-1-76.

To limit the claimant's recovc:

for the loss of his hand to that wage which he was

receivr

in a part-time job working his way through college is
contrary to the well-established rules wi·th re gard to
interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This

1'

supported by the rationale in the New York cases previously
cited.
The Donnelly case thoughtfully analyzed the rule that
the increase should be limited to the same employment and
recognized the harshness of that rule in certain jobs and
situations:
The rule that a finding of wage expectancy must be
limited to the same or a similar employment should
have no application to the peculiar and unusual status
of a newsboy. The statute does not require it, and
no judicial decision has gone that far.
In the Rose
case, supra, we said:
"We do not reach the question
whether the rule is so inflexible as not to yield
to peculiar or unusual circumstances when the salutary
purpose of subdivision 5 might otherwise be
thwarted, * * *." We now say that the rule is not so
"inflexible" that it must be applied to the peculiar
status of a newsboy and thus deprive him of fair
and adequate compensation for an injury simply
because he was injured in a temporary and part-time
employment.
(Emphasis added) 174 N.Y.S.2d at 363-364.
The Court then went on to explain the reasoning
underlying the distinctions:
It appears without dispute that newsboys are hired
only between the ages of twelve and eighteen, and they
must relinquish the employment upon attaining the age
of eighteen.
It is a matter of common knowledge that
it is a temporary, part-time employment, and never
intended by the employer or the employee to be
permanent.
It is also a matter of common knowledge
that the vast majority of newsboys enter other walks
of life upon attaining majority, and that most of
them attain substantial success. The rule in question
undoubtedly emanated from the fact that most minor
employees enter a field of employment in which they
expect to continue and in which they would normally
be advanced and receive increased earnings.
In
such cases it would be unfair to base a wage expectancy upon some other and more lucrative type of
employment.
However, a newsboy never expects or
intends to continue in the same employment, and it
would be equally unfair to confine his wage expectancy
to employment as a newsboy or even in the newspaper
business.
This claimant has a permant disability, sustained
in his employment, which he will carry with him through
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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life and will be as much present and as m
.
.
uc 11 of a
handicap after he attains majority as it ·
.
.
is
now.
He s h ou la not be limited to compensation based u
0
a paltry $9.29 a week, earned as a part-time
Pn
· h was never intended to newsbo"
b ecause o f a ru l e wh ic
a
"
such an unusual and peculiar class of employ
~~~
(Emphasis added)
174 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
ees.
The underlined portions demonstrate th

e striking

similarities between a youthful newsboy and a part-time
college employee:

(1)

both employments were temporary a;:

part-time,

(2)

the employment was never intended to be

permanent,

(3)

a vast majority of the class in question

enter .other fields and attain substantial success (this
is even more true with regard to college students) as
opposed to those who enter a field of employment in which
they expect to continue

(apprentices), and (4) the rule

was not intended to apply under the above circumstances.
The clarity and persuasiveness of this reasoning, together
with the basic unfairness of the situation, clearly point
to the decision reached by Administrative Law Judge as or:,
that is equitable and just under the circumstances.
This line of reasoning was re-affirmed in the lat:
Haldane decision, supra, and the appellant believes that
i t should be applied in this case for the reason that the
situations are practically identical.
It would certainly be contrary to the spirit 01
the statute in question and the cases cited in Point

1

.,
i.

. s hand were predica:
a young man's award for the loss Of hi
.
temporary
on the wages he was receiving in a part-time,
·
job that was only intended to last a very short time.
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POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY
AND UNREl\SONABLE MANNER WHEN IT REFUSED TO HEAR EVIDENCE
AS TO THE WAGES IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT IN WHICH THE
APPELLANT WAS ENGAGED.
In his Motion for Review of Modification of Award,
the claimant asked the Industrial Commission for permission
to present additional evidence on what constituted the
~verage

weekly wage within the same employment.

(R.186).

The Commission had previously found that this was the basis
upon which the average weekly wage rate was to be computed.
(R.178).

In ascertaining the wage rate to be used in

computing the claimant's benefits, the Commission used the
figure of $3.25 per hour.

It is the appellant's contention

that this figure is totally arbitrary.

It represents the

rate to which the appellant would have been raised in a
very short time at the same job, but it certainly has very
little to do with the wages in that type of employment.
This very issue was confronted in the Williamson
case, supra, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court made the
following finding:
The prevailing rate scale in the industry in which
the injury was sustained, in the geographical area
in which it was sustained, while persuasive, is
not controlling, as it is reasonably to be supposed
that a minor will change his employment at a later
date.
425 P.2d at 994.
On that same page, the Court said:
In Harmon's Texaco Service Station v. Kessinger,
Okl., 365 P.2d 131, we held this statute should be
liberally construed in favor of the minor. The
-15-
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court in the Harm?n's Texaco case cites with
approval the earlier case of Snoernake st a t·ion v
Stephens, Okl., 277 P.2d 998.
The Shoemak
·
·
·
e case
is in turn based on the New York Ap-pellat D' . .
· ·
·
e i v1s1on
d ecision in Szmuda v. Percy Kent Bag co
.
3
2
. ' 214 App
Div.
41,
12 N.Y.S. 139, which holds that th
·
wages received by the minor
in the particul ar e ernploi·.
men t d oes not necessarily control, and Point
·
s hout the
s t rang pro b a b i· l i· ty t h at a minor
worker will
his employment.
c ange
It is the appellant's belief that, taking into considerat,
all of the factors and the intent of the law, this is a
much better-reasoned result and urges the Court to consids:
i t in interpretting Section 35-1-76.

In any event, the

plaintiff should certainly be allowed the opportunity of
presenting evidence as to the average wages in the same
type of work.
CONCLUSION
In enacting § 35-1-76, the Utah State Legislature
has clearly provided that, in circumstances similar to
those in the present case, the Industrial Commission may,
and indeed should, increase the injured employee's award
in light of his age and experience.

This case is a class'.c

example of the circumstances anticipated by that section.
Jerry Probst was a college student training for a professic
degree.

·
·
means to a mud
T h e JOb
was a temporary, par t - t ime

better paying job.

He never intended to do that work on

a permanent basis and certainly did not anticipate the
horrible injury which occurred.

The evidence clearlY

showed that he is capable of and, indeed, already has
a under '
earned wages far beyond the maximum amount allowe
. purpo:,
compensation
:
the Workmen's Compensation statutes for
. s age and experience (
To increase the award in light o f hi
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dict:itced by the facts in the case and was not an abuse of
discretion by the Administrative Law Judge.

In modifying

that award, the Industrial Commission acted in an arbitrary
and capricious fashion and contrary to the established law
of the State of Utah.

For these reasons, the Commission's

holding should be reversed and the previous award reinstated.
If the Court should find that the acts of the
commission were not arbitrary, the appellant believes that
the matter should be remanded to receive evidence of the
appellant's earning capacity, either within or out of the
same type of employment, there being no valid evidence
upon which the Commission could reasonably have reached the
conclusion it did.
DATED at Orem, Utah, this 17th day of March, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

RY E D. McEUEN
At orney for PlaintiffAppellant
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah
84601
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief to
Frank G. Noel, Strong & Hanni, Attorneys at Law, Suite 604
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this 17th

day of March, 1978.
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